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INTRODUCTION 
 
The African Union, which came into existence in 2002, seems in 
some ways to be a copy of the European Union.  First of all, 
there is the obvious use of “Union” in the name.  Secondly, the 
institutions of the African Union parallel those of the European 
Union.  Specifically, the African Union has a Pan-African 
Parliament, an executive African Commission, an African Court of 
Justice, an Executive Council (to match the European Union’s 
Council of Ministers), and — at the apex — the Assembly of the  
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African Union, grouping its political leaders and meeting at 
summits (as per the European Council).  Third and finally, the 
future plans of the African Union include other parallels, in 
particular an African Central Bank. 
  Yet the African Union as an historical-political expression 
differs in three key ways from the European Union: it united 
almost all of (independent) Africa from its roots in the 
Organization of African Unity, it has a clear, geographical 
sense of where is Africa, and it lacks democratic cohesion, the 
occasional suspension of a member notwithstanding.  These three 
points will be outlined briefly in turn, in each case 
contrasting them with the European Union.  The result is that 
each entity has “existential” challenges, just differing ones — 
ultimately greater for the African Union. 
 
 
COMPARATIVE ORIGINS 
 
The key founding organization of African integration was the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), founded in 1963.  Being a 
loose organization without any effective political structures, 
and one without any specific economic focus, one could say that 
there seemed no reason for African countries not to join.  
Indeed, no less than 33 countries founded the OAU.  The main 
“non-founder” and indeed “non-joiner” was South Africa, whose 
white rulers did not see themselves as African, at least in a 
cultural sense.  South Africa would join upon its 
democratization and shift to majority rule in 1994.  Some 20 or 
so other countries would join the OAU upon gaining their 
respective independence.  One can also note here the admission  
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of non-independent Western Sahara in 1982, an event which caused 
Morocco (which claims the Western Sahara) to withdraw in 1984.  
The membership of the OAU simply transferred over to the African 
Union when the latter was formed at the start of this decade.  
The bottom line here, though, is that most African Union members 
were there at the start (in 1963), did not have to apply for 
membership, and did not have to meet any criterion beyond being 
African.  Moreover, further expansion of the African Union is 
unlikely, unless Morocco wishes to return, or a new sovereign 
country appears in Africa (Somaliland, or one of the few 
remaining and tiny British or French colonies).  That said, 
acceptance is relatively easy in the sense that it only requires 
the approval of a simple majority of current members. 
  In contrast, the European Union traces its roots back to 
the European Coal and Steel Community of 1952, and the European 
Economic and Atomic Energy Communities of 1958.  These 
communities, especially that of coal and steel, required a 
giving up of sectoral sovereignty.  This limited their appeal to 
the initial six founding members.  Moreover, competition from 
the confederal European Free Trade Association meant that the 
European Community was not the only game in town.  Expansion 
thus did not begin until the 1970s, with most members of the 
current European Union thus having undergone a formal 
application.  Of course, expansion could have come earlier if de 
Gaulle had not vetoed Britain’s entry, but what this also 
established is the requirement of unanimity to accept new 
members — something later formalized (Treaty of European Union, 
Article 49).  With the ending of the cold war and the 
possibility of many new post-communist members applying, the 
European Union was faced with — and, in 2004, underwent — an  
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expansion in both absolute numbers and percentage terms that 
never occurred in the African Union.  This caused it to give 
some specific thought about the requirements for membership.  It 
also broadened greatly the debate about the boundaries of 
Europe.  On the former point, specific criteria were indeed 
agreed to at the 1993 Copenhagen European Council — these being 
a stable democracy with the rule of law, human rights, and 
protection of minorities (in other words, a liberal rather than 
just a basic electoral democracy); a functioning market economy; 
and the economic and administrative ability to adopt the acquis 
communautaire of the EU and adhere to the goals of further 
union, including monetary union.  On the latter point (the 
boundaries of Europe), however, nothing specific has been 
written down.  Presumably the rejection of Morocco’s 1987 
application on the grounds that it is not European has drawn a 
line between Europe and Africa, or at least set a precedent in 
terms of Africa.  That said, it should be stressed that it is 
the Commission and the Council that determine “Europeanness” 
and, especially for the Council, this is a political as much as 
a geographical assessment. 
 
 
GEOGRAPHY AS CLARITY OR CONFUSION 
 
The African Union is open to any African state (Constitutive Act 
of the African Union, Article 29).  Likewise, the European 
Community was open to any European country (Treaty of Rome, 
Article 237), and nowadays the European Union is open to any 
European state which respects various democratic principles 
(Treaty of European Union, Article 49).  That said, the African  
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Union has obviously taken a clear and geographic definition of 
Africa as being the African continent, bounded as it is by the 
Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the 
Atlantic Ocean, but including islands off the coast in the two 
aforementioned oceans.  The only African, and African Union, 
country that has a land border with a non-African country is 
Egypt, which has a border of 277 kilometres with Israel 
(including the Gaza strip) — far less than its borders with 
Libya and Sudan.  Thus although Egypt may politically be part of 
(also in) the Middle East, geographically it is clearly African. 
  In contrast, the European Union is (at least at times) 
divided over what is meant by (where is) Europe.  
Geographically, of course, Europe is not strictly speaking a 
continent but rather the western end of the Eurasian continent.  
It does have geographic clarity due to water boundaries on its 
north, west, and south, but the eastern and southeastern 
geographic borders are less clear.  Generally the Ural 
Mountains, the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus Mountains, the Black 
Sea, the Bosporus / Dardanelles, and the Aegean Sea are used as 
geographic references.  That said, such features divide both 
Russia and Turkey, and likewise the Caucasus Mountains are 
straddled by the three Transcaucasus countries.
1  Nor it is all 
clear how Cyprus is geographically European (especially if 
Turkey is not). 
  That said, for much of the postwar era geography was not 
the central definitional criterion of Europe for European 
 
1 
    John McCormick, Understanding the European Union: A 
Concise Introduction, third edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), p. 37.  
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integration.  Instead, it was more geopolitics, that is, the 
cold war division of Europe which effectively limited it to 
Western Europe (this side of the Iron Curtain).
2  The cold war 
division has now been modified into the notion of the European 
Union as a grouping of democracies (see the next section), but 
that is a much less clear geographic line.  Based on the spread 
of democracy, then why not now Ukraine or Turkey as part of 
Europe?  Or Israel?  Or Canada as part of a North Atlantic 
Union?   
  A second key criterion of Europeanness has been a high 
level of socio-economic development (including 
industrialization).  We see this now in much of the Copenhagen 
Criteria, but it was implicit from the start: a (then-) rural 
country like Ireland or Denmark without much industry was not a 
good fit for the European communities of the 1950s.  That said, 
this “dividing line” of economic development was also imperfect 
since historically it ran through Italy rather than separating 
Italy from less “European” places (in many ways it still does).  
Conversely, to parallel the previous point, its level of 
development does not really define Europe, certainly not vis-à-
vis North America. 
  Indeed, the democratic and developmental criteria agreed to 
at Copenhagen need to be seen as being additional to being 
European, rather than defining what is European.  These criteria 
can certain exclude / delay various applicants, at least until 
 
2 
    William Wallace, The Transformation of Western Europe 
(London: Pinter Publishers for the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1990), p. 11, who noted that Western 
Europe was part of what he called “Euramerica” in the North  
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the criteria are met.  But they do not deal with the issue of 
whether an applicant country is European to begin with.  If not 
geography, then perhaps culture can do this.  The reality though 
is that culture has been an evolving criterion.  Historically 
Europe in this regard meant places that had been through the 
Enlightenment — thus excluding many Eastern areas yes but also 
Iberia and the Balkans.  Of course, by culture one often really 
means religion.  The Catholic nature of the original six (or at 
least their leaders) is well known.  So is the debate about 
admitting Muslim (albeit officially secular) Turkey, although 
few seem to make the same objections about Albania or Bosnia.  
What is more interesting is the notion of Europe as implying 
Western Christendom (be this Catholic or Protestant) as opposed 
to Eastern Christendom.  Certainly the Northeastern borders of 
today’s European Union basically follows the division between 
Western Christendom and Eastern Orthodoxy, including largely 
Protestant Estonia and Latvia and largely Catholic Lithuania and 
Poland, and in turn excluding Orthodox Russia, Belarus, and 
Ukraine.  However, this division is not present in the Balkans, 
at least not since Orthodox Greece joined the then-Community in 
1981 and certainly not with the 2007 admission of Orthodox 
Romania and Bulgaria.  Europe, in terms of both the present and 
the future of the European Union, cannot cleanly be defined in 
terms of religion either.  The reality is that the definition of 
Europe is ultimately whatever the European Council wishes to use 
when assessing a given application, and that for disputed areas 
this definition may change over time.  As a consequence, the 
European Union will thus continue to lack a coherent territory 
 
Atlantic.  
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(or ultimate territory), something which clearly helps to 
create/reinforce national identity — as was the case 
historically for the United States and also Canada. 
 
 
POLITICAL COHESION 
 
Yet even though the potential boundaries of the European Union 
remain contested since the definition of Europe is contested, 
the political criteria for membership gives the members a clear 
sense of cohesion.  Table 1 gives the calendar year 2006 scores 
from Freedom House for the 27 current European Union members.  
(Freedom House scores both political rights and civil liberties 
on a 1 to 7 scale with 1 being the most free and 7 the least 
free.)  As can be seen, there is also no variation here in terms 
of the EU members’ scores.  Moreover, all members are electoral 
democracies; indeed depending on one’s cut-off either all or 
almost all are liberal democracies with full civil liberties. 
This fits in with Schimmelfennig’s analysis that being a liberal 
democracy is the best predictor of EU (and related) expansion.
3   
That said, it should be noted that even if one now considers 
Bulgaria and Romania to be liberal democracies, they were not 
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    “The more a state complied with domestic liberal norms, 
the more likely it was to establish institutionalized relations 
with and to apply for membership in the EU, NATO and the CoE 
[Council of Europe], to join these organizations, and to remain 
a member in good standing.” Frank Schimmelfennig, “Liberal 
community and enlargement: An event history analysis”, ch. 8 in 
Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, The Politics of European 
Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches (London and New York:  
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when their application was approved (hence the continued 
pronounced Commission oversight of them through this day). 
 
 
TABLE 1 — 2006 Freedom House Scores for European Union Members 
 
 political  civil  electoral 
member rights  liberties  democracy 
? 
 
Austria  1 1 yes 
Belgium  1 1 yes 
Bulgaria  1 2 yes 
Cyprus  1 1 yes 
Czech  Republic  1 1 yes 
Denmark  1 1 yes 
Estonia  1 1 yes 
Finland  1 1 yes 
France  1 1 yes 
Germany  1 1 yes 
Greece  1 2 yes 
Hungary  1 1 yes 
Ireland  1 1 yes 
Italy  1 1 yes 
Latvia  1 1 yes 
Lithuania  1 1 yes 
Luxembourg  1 1 yes 
Malta  1 1 yes 
Netherlands  1 1 yes 
Poland  1 1 yes 
Portugal  1 1 yes 
Romania  2 2 yes 
Slovakia  1 1 yes 
Slovenia  1 1 yes 
 
Routledge, 2005), p. 194.  
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Spain  1 1 yes 
Sweden  1 1 yes 
United  Kingdom  1 1 yes 
 
mean 1.04  1.11 
standard deviation  0.19  0.32 
 
 
 
  In contrast, Africa is nowadays a continent of great 
variation in democratization — more so than 20 years ago when 
there were very few ongoing democracies (just Botswana, Gambia, 
and Mauritius) and thus relatively little variation in 
democratization.  As Table 2 shows African Union members range 
from strong democracies (of these the most important is South 
Africa) through basic democracies like Kenya and then 
autocracies with some freedoms like Nigeria to closed 
autocracies with no or effectively no freedoms.  Indeed, no less 
than nine African Union members have Freedom House’s lowest 
score possible (that of 7) on political rights.  Only 24 members 
are even electoral democracies (as of the end of 2006); 29 are 
not.  Barring any further spread of democratization which seems 
unlikely, these variations in democratization — or more 
specifically the large number of autocracies which are members — 
will prevent any serious political union in Africa. 
 
 
TABLE 2 — 2006 Freedom House Scores for African Union Members 
 
 political  civil  electoral 
member rights  liberties  democracy 
?  
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Algeria  6 5 no 
Angola  6 5 no 
Benin  2 2 yes 
Botswana  2 2 yes 
Burkina  Faso  5 3 no 
Burundi  4 5 yes 
Cameroon  6 6 no 
Cape  Verde  1 1 yes 
Central African Republic  5  4  yes 
Chad  6 6 no 
Comoros  3 4 yes 
Congo, R (Brazzaville)  6  5  no 
Congo, DR (Kinshasa)  5  6  no 
Côte  d’Ivoire  7 6 no 
Djibouti  5 5 no 
Egypt  6 5 no 
Equatorial  Guinea  7 6 no 
Eritrea  7 6 no 
Ethiopia  5 5 no 
Gabon  6 4 no 
Gambia  5 4 no 
Ghana  1 2 yes 
Guinea  6 5 no 
Guinea-Bissau  4 4 yes 
Kenya  3 3 yes 
Lesotho  2 3 yes 
Liberia  3 4 yes 
Libya  7 7 no 
Madagascar  4 3 yes 
Malawi  4 3 yes 
Mali  2 2 yes 
Mauritania  5 4 no 
Mauritius  1 2 yes 
Mozambique  3 4 yes 
Namibia  2 2 yes 
Niger  3 3 yes  
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Nigeria  4 4 no 
Rwanda  6 5 no 
São Tomé and Príncipe  2  2  yes 
Senegal  2 3 yes 
Seychelles  3 3 yes 
Sierra  Leone  4 3 yes 
Somalia  7 7 no 
South  Africa  2 2 yes 
Sudan  7 7 no 
Swaziland  7 5 no 
Tanzania  4 3 no 
Togo  6 5 no 
Tunisia  6 5 no 
Uganda  5 4 no 
Western  Sahara  7 6 no 
Zambia  3 4 yes 
Zimbabwe  7 6 no 
 
mean 4.47  4.15 
standard deviation  1.90  1.52 
 
 
 
  In fact, amongst the principles of the African Union as 
outlined it its Constitutive Act are “Respect for democratic 
principles, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance” 
(Article 4m) and “Condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional 
changes of governments” (Article 4p).  However, the first 
principle noted is not ever fleshed out with any specifics.  The 
second principle noted is though.  The key Article (30) here of 
the Constitutive Act of the African Union states that 
“Governments which shall come to power through unconstitutional 
means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of 
the Union.”  This Article was certainly applied to Mauritania  
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after its 2005 coup.  Nevertheless, it is generally a weak 
statement for multiple reasons.  First of all, the meaning of 
unconstitutional is not spelled out.  Consequently, as Heyns, 
Baimu, and Killander ask about this Article, “does gaining or 
retaining power through a massively rigged election constitute 
an unconstitutional usurpation of power?”
4  (One can think of 
Nigeria as the most recent major example of this.)  Second, a 
government can be constitutional without being democratic, such 
as the absolute monarchy of Swaziland.  Third, the reference is 
merely to governments that come to power (in the present) not 
those that have been in power since the formation of the Union — 
such as the sultanistic regime of Qadhafi in Libya or the 
various military (or military-backed) regimes of the continent.  
Fourth and finally, no mention is made of (maintaining) civil 
liberties, so the bar here is obviously less than the liberal 
democracy required by the European Union.  Certainly these 
factors would be taken more seriously if Article 4m on democracy 
was made more of a condition for (continued) membership — but as 
just noted this would exclude most current members! 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Both the European Union and the African Union have what might be 
called existential challenges.  Yet of these that gripping the 
 
4 
    Christof Heyns, Evarist Baimu, and Magnus Killander, “The 
African Union”, German Yearbook of International Law / Jahrbuch 
für internationales Recht, Volume 47 (2004), p. 273.  
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African Union is much more serious.  Although it may not be the 
“dictator’s club” that was the OAU, nor is it in any sense a 
democratic grouping like the European Union.  Indeed, in terms 
of level of democracy the African Union today contains a full 
range of regime types.  This makes any comprehensive transfer of 
power to African Union institutions, and ultimately the 
effective working of such institutions, quite unlikely. 
  In contrast, by its origins and requirements, the EU is a 
grouping of democracies, indeed essentially liberal democracies.  
This has facilitated the workings of its various institutions, 
issues of a “democratic deficit” notwithstanding.  Yet by being 
open to all European democracies without a clear and consistent 
definition of Europe the European Union is caught in ongoing 
debates about where it should wind up.  This will have 
ramifications for various key applications, not just Turkey 
today but possibly Ukraine down the road.  Of course, if Turkey 
returns to military rule and if Ukraine returns to autocracy (as 
it was under Kuchma), then the question of how European each is 
becomes moot.  Failing this, a strict requirement of “up front” 
liberal (as opposed to merely electoral) democracy for EU 
membership would exclude Turkey and also likely limit further 
eastern expansion, as there are no liberal democracies in the 
non-Baltic former Soviet Union, and little prospect of these 
without foreign (EU) assistance. 